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Security in Swarm Robotics
ABSTRACT
Inspired by social animals, such as ants, bees and fish, which appear to exhibit what has been dubbed 
‘swarm intelligence’, swarm robotic systems aim to accomplish goals that are unachievable by an indi-
vidual robot. Swarm robotics have a large number of potential uses, including applications in the military, 
monitoring, disaster relief, healthcare and commercial applications. To be able to achieve their goals, 
it is of utmost importance that communications between agents are secure in the presence of possibly 
malicious interruptions and attacks from adversaries. The authors will discuss the issues surrounding 
the provision of secure communications in swarm robotics: what secure communications mean, how 
the characteristics of swarm robotics present a security challenge, the relationship between security is-
sues for swarm robotics and other network technologies, and how different adversarial models demand 
different types of solutions. It will then be discussed what the important open research questions are in 
secure communications in swarm robotics.
INTRODUCTION
Swarm robotics is concerned with the coordination 
of large numbers of relatively simple robots. Al-
though there is no universally accepted definition 
for swarm robotic systems, Şahin (2005) proposes 
the following working definition: swarm robotics 
is the study of how a large number of relatively 
simple physically embodied agents can be designed 
such that a desired collective behaviour emerges 
from the local interactions among agents and 
between the agents and their environment.
Swarm robotic systems aim to accomplish 
goals that are unachievable by an individual ro-
bot. In a number of situations, having numerous 
simple robots forming a swarm, rather than an 
individual complex robot, could be beneficial as 
it may be cost effective or achieve the set goal 
more effectively. Because of this, swarm robotics 
have a large number of potential uses, including 
applications in the military, medical scenarios, 
disaster relief, monitoring and commercial ap-
plications (Şahin, 2005).
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Şahin (2005) explicitly puts forwards five 
characteristics as criteria for distinguishing swarm 
robotics from other multi-robot research in Sec-
tion 3 of his paper. Şahin suggests these charac-
teristics as a way to differentiate swarm robotics 
from other multi-robot systems. His five defining 
characteristics of swarm robotics are:
1.  Autonomous Robots. Robots are able to act 
without the direct intervention of humans 
and have control over their own actions and 
internal state.
2.  Large number of Robots. Closely linked 
to the idea of scalability, there should be a 
large number of robots, or studies should 
be applicable to the control of large robotic 
swarms.
3.  Consist of a Few Homogeneous Groups of 
Robots. The swarm network should consist 
of relatively few groups of homogeneous 
robots.
4.  Relatively Incapable or Inefficient Robots. 
On an individual level, the robots should 
be relatively simple and either incapable 
of completing tasks individually, requiring 
cooperation amongst the swarm to achieve 
the global goal, or working as a group should 
improve the performance and robustness of 
the handling of the task.
5.  Local Sensing and Communication 
Capabilities. The robots should have local 
and limited sensing and communication 
abilities to ensure distributed coordination 
amongst the swarm. A global communication 
channel may be used to download a com-
mon program onto the swarm, however this 
should not be used for coordination amongst 
the robots (as this is likely to be unscalable) 
and the communication is considered to be 
one way, in the direction from the channel 
to the swarm.
Other characteristics not explicitly listed by 
Şahin (although some are implicit) include:
6.  Co-Operate to Accomplish Tasks: As the 
robots are relatively incapable or inefficient, 
they are required to, or would benefit from, 
cooperating to complete any given tasks.
7.  Mobile: The robots are mobile. It is generally 
assumed their movement is not predictable. 
Sometimes, however, the robots may be 
bounded to movement within a predeter-
mined boundary.
8.  Self-Organising: Swarms should be self-or-
ganising, defined by Camazine, Deneubourg, 
Franks, Sneyd and Theraulaz (2002), as the 
process in which pattern at the global level 
of a system emerges solely from numerous 
interactions among the lower-level compo-
nents of the system.
9.  Collective Emergent Behaviour: A col-
lective behaviour emerges from the local 
interactions among agents and between the 
agents and their environment.
10.  Decentralised Control: The individual 
robots must operate on local information 
obtained to accomplish global goals. There 
is no central point of control in the system 
and coordination is completely distributed. 
This characteristic contributes to achieving 
robustness, as there is no common node 
failure point or vulnerability (Winfield & 
Nembrini, 2006).
11.  No Individual Identity: In a swarm, there 
are relatively few groups of homogeneous 
robots. In each homogeneous group, the 
robots can be identical, as they do not need 
to be individually identified. Thus individual 
identification is not necessarily required.
12.  Lack of Synchronicity: As described by 
Beni (2005), the units of the swarm do not 
move synchronously or sequentially, but 
interact dynamically.
13.  Range of Communication: Swarms use 
both explicit and implicit communication 
methods. Explicit communications are where 
one robot communicates directly with anoth-
er. Such methods of communication include 
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radio frequency and infra-red technologies, 
which have previously been well studied. 
Implicit communication includes interaction 
via sensing of other robots, their behaviour 
and their interaction with the environment. 
Communication such as this is known as 
stigmergy. An example of stigmergy in nature 
is that of foraging ants that lay pheromones 
to communicate and create foraging patterns. 
These are believed to increase their foraging 
performance (Şahin, 2005, Section 3.4).
These characteristics contribute to properties 
of swarm robotics that are desirable in many ap-
plications, especially in unpredictable or hostile 
environments:
1.  Resilience: The loss of individual agents has 
little impact on the success of the task. Many 
agents collect the same data so the function-
ing of individual agents is not critical.
2.  Decentralised control: The coordination of 
the swarm is distributed. Again, this ensures 
there are no single points of failure.
3.  Adaptability: The swarm will adapt itself 
dynamically to the environment, allowing 
changes in topology.
Chapter Outline
Much research on swarm robotics assumes a benign, 
or at least a non-malicious, environment where fail-
ure of agents thus arises only due to malfunction or 
accidents. However, many proposed deployments of 
swarm robotics are in hostile or unpredictable envi-
ronments - there may be adversaries who actively 
attempt to sabotage the swarm, or who attempt to 
eavesdrop on important and confidential informa-
tion collected by the swarm. As demonstrated by 
Berghmans and Deckers (2013) in a simulation, 
adversaries were able to successfully slow down 
or freeze collective exploration with a number of 
attacks. It is important that attacks such as these 
are protected against.
In the next section, we will provide an over-
view of basic security services identified in the 
ISO standard for the security architecture of the 
OSI reference model (ISO, 1989), and consider 
what security services cryptography can provide.
In the section ‘Secure Communications in 
Swarms’, we will focus on secure communica-
tions in swarm robotics by first considering some 
examples of use. We will then examine how some 
of the characteristics of a swarm present a chal-
lenge to its security. Swarm robotics uses a range 
of communication methods: direct and indirect 
communication through the environment (in par-
ticular, stigmergy and local sensing). These com-
munication methods and their impact on swarm 
communications security will also be discussed.
From a security perspective, swarm robotics 
can be regarded as a special type of computer 
network with additional characteristics. As such, 
swarm robotics share many characteristics with 
a number of other technologies that have already 
been subjected to extensive security analysis, 
such as mobile sensor networks (MSNs) (Walters, 
Liang, Shi & Chaudhary, 2007), mobile ad-hoc 
networks (MANETs) (Akbani, Korkmaz & Raju, 
2012), vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) 
(Raya & Hubaux, 2007) and other multi-robot sys-
tems and software agents (Wooldridge, 2009). In 
the section ‘Related Technologies’, we will briefly 
describe some of the main security challenges 
for these technologies and examine how these 
compare with the potential security challenges 
faced in swarm robotics. Following this, the is-
sue of how to model stigmergy in order to secure 
this indirect form of communication is discussed.
In most security research, adversaries and 
attackers are classified according to both the 
information they have access to and their capabili-
ties. We will discuss both internal and external 
adversaries in detail and consider what threats 
they pose to the security of swarm robotics. After 
this, some challenges unique to the swarm will 
be highlighted and discussed.
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As little research into security in swarm robot-
ics has been conducted thus far, there are a number 
of open questions. A discussion of a selection of 
these will conclude the chapter.
BACKGROUND
In this section, we give a short overview of the 
general issues surrounding secure communica-
tions. Many authors have provided an overview 
of the subject, such as Akbani et al. (2012) and 
Wooldridge (2009). We refer the reader to them 
for more background and details.
Introduction to Secure 
Communications
A communications system provides a channel 
for transmission of information from point A to 
B. Swarm robotics uses wireless transmission 
links, as well as local sensing (such as infra-red) 
and stigmergy. Messages sent over these chan-
nels need to be encoded for transmission. This is 
summarised in Figure 1.
With the possibility of noise or interference in 
the transmission channel, error-correcting codes 
are deployed to determine whether the message 
was received correctly, and whether it can be fully 
recovered. The theory of error-correcting codes 
deals with these issues (Trappe, Washington, 
Anshel & Boklan, 2007).
It is also generally assumed that the commu-
nication channel is insecure - that is, an adversary 
may intercept, read and modify messages sent 
through this channel. There are several different 
aspects to “security” that need to be considered, 
the most important of which are commonly identi-
fied as (ISO, 1989):
1.  Confidentiality: The assurance that no one 
other than the intended recipient(s) can read 
the data; in other words, the data is kept 
secret between the sender and recipient.
2.  Integrity: The assurance that the data has 
not been altered, either maliciously or ac-
cidentally, in an unauthorised way.
3.  Entity Authentication: Sometimes called 
identification, entity authentication serves 
to identify specific entities in isolation from 
any other activity the entity may want to 
perform.
4.  Data Origin Authentication: This service 
identifies a specific entity as the source or 
origin of a given piece of data.
5.  Availability: Availability ensures that ac-
cessibility and usability are available upon 
demand by an authorised entity. The loss 
of availability is commonly referred to as 
denial-of-service.
In a swarm, it may be desirable to apply any 
number of these services to the data being ex-
changed between individual robots. Some security 
services may be more important than others and 
the services required are dependent on the ap-
plication of the swarm. Before we consider the 
provision of security services specific to swarm 
communications, we will briefly discuss how 
cryptography can be used to deal with some of 
these issues.
Cryptography
Cryptography is the art (and science) of design-
ing systems to transform messages in such a way 
that two entities can communicate securely over 
an insecure channel.
Figure 1. Communications system
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The information to be communicated is com-
monly referred to as the plaintext. In a basic 
communications scenario, the sender encrypts the 
plaintext using a predetermined encryption key. 
The result is known as the ciphertext and it is the 
ciphertext that is sent over the insecure channel. 
The receiver, who knows the decryption key, is able 
to decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the plaintext. 
A basic cryptosystem is summarised in Figure 2.
In traditional (symmetric-key) cryptosystems 
the communicating parties first need to agree on 
a randomly chosen key, which is used for both 
encryption and decryption and must be kept 
secret. If the key is compromised then so is the 
entire system. Being able to efficiently agree 
upon and exchange a key securely is known as 
the key distribution problem. An overview of 
this can be found in Menezes, Van Oorschot and 
Vanstone (1996).
However, there also exist cryptosystems where 
the encryption key and the decryption key are not 
identical. These public-key (or asymmetric) cryp-
tosystems have the property that the encryption 
key can be made public, and only the decryption 
key needs to be kept secret. These cryptosystems 
have the advantage that encryption keys can be 
obtained from public directories, thus avoiding 
the need to preshare secrets in advance of com-
munication. In general, public key cryptosystems 
are slower than symmetric-key cryptosystems. 
However they can be used to establish secret keys 
for a symmetric-key cryptosystem, which can then 
be used to encrypt the data. Again, an overview 
and details can be found in Menezes et al. (1996).
All ciphertexts are sent over the communication 
channel and are hence observable. It is generally 
also assumed that the encryption process (the 
algorithm used) is known by any adversary and 
hence security of a cryptosystem relies entirely 
on the security of the decryption key.
Note that Figure 2 describes the basic model 
for using a cryptosystem to provide confidentiality. 
Similar models exist for the use of cryptography 
to provide integrity and authentication. It should 




Before we consider the security of communica-
tions in swarm robotics we consider some sce-
narios where swarm robotics may be used and 
examine the security issues that might arise in 
these scenarios. An example of how important it 
is to secure communications in a robotics swarm 
is illustrated by Berghmans and Decker (2013), 
where they simulate and analyse six different 
attacks on collective exploration. They conclude 
that the collective exploration algorithm used 
was vulnerable to threats from enemies and that, 
before swarms are used in real world applications, 
security measures should be taken into account.
Applications and Behaviours 
of Swarm Robotics
Swarm robotics have applications in many areas, 
for example, military (mine clearance and surveil-
lance), environmental monitoring, disaster relief 
and health care (medication provision, monitor-
ing, cleaning, guidance of patients and intruder 
or emergency detection).
Consider the medication provision aspect of a 
healthcare application investigated by a European 
Union 6th framework programme project, Intel-
ligent Robot Swarm for Attendance, Recognition, 
Figure 2. A cryptosystem
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Cleaning and Delivery (iWARD) (2007). This 
swarm consists of robots with a secure physical 
storage box and an input/output screen. A health 
practitioner inputs the medication required, the 
robot finds its way to the pharmacy, the pharmacist 
puts the requested medicine in the secure storage 
box, then the robot takes the medicine back to the 
healthcare practitioner. Clearly there are many 
potential security concerns: the availability of a 
robot from the swarm, the authentication of the 
healthcare practitioner and the robot, the confi-
dentiality and integrity of the information being 
transmitted/transferred, the correct routing of the 
robot, the authorisation and authentication of the 
pharmacist and the robot, and the security of the 
storage box.
The Guardians Project (2007) considered the 
example of a fire in an industrial warehouse. Ro-
bots accompany a human squad leader. The robots 
are connected wirelessly and are self-organising. 
They explore ahead of the human leader and send 
data to the leader and to central control. In this 
case the important security services are the avail-
ability of the channels between all parties and the 
authenticity of the information.
More generally, the application of swarms can 
be reduced to a number of behaviours. In (Navarro 
& Matía, 2012) a list of basic behaviours and tasks 
typical of swarm robotics is formulated. The tasks 
include pattern formation, collective movement, 
task allocation, source search, collective transport 
of objects and collective mapping. Generally, 
the behaviours key to performing these tasks are 
aggregation and dispersion (an example of a be-
haviour that is not is object clustering (Brambilla, 
Ferrante, Birattari, & Dorigo, 2013)).
Identification of Security 
Services Needed
In both the iWARD (2007) and the Guardians 
project (2007), confidential and authenticated 
communication between agents of the swarm is 
a prerequisite to the functioning of the swarm. 
These are well-studied security requirements in 
other networking environments.
In both aggregation and dispersion behaviours, 
agents must be able to sense the proximity of 
another agent from their swarm, either to then 
Figure 3. An iWARD robot
Source: Thiel, Habe and Block, 2009
Figure 4. The team of robots used in the Guardians Project
Source: Saez-Pons, Alboul, Penders and Nomdedeu, 2010
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draw closer or disperse. This requires an agent to 
be able to somehow authenticate another agent of 
the same swarm.
Challenges to Security 
Posed by the Swarm
Higgins, Tomlinson and Martin (2009a) list a 
number of challenges to providing security in a 
swarm robotic environment. These were then fur-
ther considered by Berghman and Deckers (2013). 
Most of these challenges are common to other 
technologies, while some appear to be unique to 
swarm robotics and require further consideration.
Challenges Found in 
Other Technologies
1.  Resource Constraints: A small device, 
such as an agent in a swarm, may feature 
a number of different resource constraints, 
such as storage, communication bandwidth, 
computational restrictions and energy. If any 
of these resources were to become unavail-
able, the robot might become inaccessible.
2.  Scalability: Within swarms, there is the po-
tential to have a large number of robots. As 
a result, any security solutions posed should 
be suitable for a large number of robots.
3.  Physical Capture and Tampering: A 
robot could be captured, leading to the loss 
of availability of the seized robot and the 
data held. Furthermore, an adversary might 
obtain all data on the commandeered robot 
and be able to tamper with the robot before 
reintroducing it back into the swarm.
4.  Control: Due to the distributed nature of 
swarms, there are no points of control. Any 
security solutions must bear in mind that 
swarms should consist of relatively few 
groups of homogeneous robots in which 
the individuals make decisions and oper-
ate based on local information obtained to 
accomplish global goals. This presents the 
risk that the system becomes out of control. 
As Şahin (2005, Section 3.5) describes, a 
global communication channel may be used 
to download a common program onto the 
swarm, but this channel must not be used 
for coordination amongst the swarm. This 
global communication channel may be the 
only way to communicate with the swarm 
post deployment, but this communication is 
only in one direction.
5.  Real Time: Ideally, the robots must act 
and communicate in real time. Because the 
robots’ actions are dependent on each other 
and their environment, if communicating 
and validating messages is not immediate 
then the environment around them may 
have changed before they are able to act. 
Therefore solutions should be efficient to 
enable robots to react in real time.
6.  Swarm Mobility: Security can be hard to 
achieve in mobile environments such as 
swarm robotics. Additionally, constraining 
the movement of swarm members to, for 
example, stay within set boundaries, may 
pose further complications.
7.  Key Management: Cryptographic keys form 
a core component of any security mecha-
nism suitable for swarms (Dolev, Lahiani, 
& Yung, 2007), and the dynamic nature in 
which robots join and leave the swarm could 
present problems for key management.
8.  Intrusion Detection: If a foreign entity joins 
the swarm, or if a robot is reprogrammed 
and released back into the swarm, the swarm 
will need to be able to detect an intrusion. 
Intrusion detection systems work by target-
ing anomalous behaviour. However, because 
robots are autonomous entities, apparently 
anomalous behaviour may in fact represent 
suitable reactions to their environment and 
could diffuse through the swarm and eventu-
ally become desirable, collective behaviour 
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that would enable the swarm to efficiently 
achieve their goal. Trying to identify and 
stem anomalous behaviour may result in 
making the swarm inefficient. However, 
there is a chance that anomalous behaviour 
is initiated by an intruder and is malicious, 
hence the correct identification and appropri-
ate response is vital. Telling the difference 
between malicious anomalous behaviour and 
desirable, pioneering anomalous behaviour 
is a difficult problem. These issues will be 
discussed further when addressing chal-
lenges unique to the swarm.
9.  Managing Learning: Robots have the ability 
to learn and react to environmental changes. 
An adversary may be able to take advantage 
of this and change the pattern of behaviour 
in the swarm in order to achieve its goal.
Challenges Unique to the Swarm
1.  Identity and Secrets: In order to provide a 
number of security services, the identifica-
tion of robots is vital; as noted by Higgins 
et al. (2009a, Section 3.2). Robots could 
either be identified as individuals, with each 
individual robot having a unique identity, 
or as part of a swarm, where the distinction 
between robots in a swarm is unnecessary 
and ensuring that the robot belongs to the 
swarm is sufficient. However, there are set-
tings where individual identity is undesirable 
(Flocchini, Prencipe, Santoro & Widmayer, 
2005) which may make implementing some 
security solutions difficult.
2.  Stigmergy: Stigmergy refers to the com-
munication of agents via the environment: 
robots modify their environment, which 
is noted by other robots and affects their 
behaviour. As an example, ants lay down 
pheromones on the way home to their nest and 
other ants follow this trail. When applying 
stigmergy to swarms, agents are required to 
both ‘read’ and ‘write’ to their environment. 
Just like with direct communication, when 
communicating using stigmergy, we need 
to ensure that
a.  Only agents in the vicinity can 
communicate;
b.  Messages left in the environment can 
only be read by legitimate agents;
c.  Messages read in the environment are 
indeed from legitimate agents;
d.  Messages are only valid for a certain 
time period;
e.  Messages left in the environment have 
not been altered, either maliciously or 
accidentally.
3.  Local Sensing: Local sensing refers to how 
an agent’s behaviour is affected not by direct 
communication with other agents, but by 
what the agent can observe in its immediate 
surroundings, such as the configuration or 
behaviour (velocity of movement, for ex-
ample) of its neighbours. Whereas stigmergy 
requires one swarm member to actively leave 
a message in the environment and another 
robot to read it, local sensing involves only 
a robot sensing its environment.
RELATED TECHNOLOGIES
A number of technologies that have similarities 
to swarm robotic networks will now be discussed 
(see also (Higgins, Tomlinson & Martin 2009b)). 
These technologies have already been subjected 
to a degree of security analysis and, after relat-
ing them to swarm robotic networks, any unique 
features of robotic swarms that should be further 
considered in terms of security are identified.
Mobile Sensor Networks
A sensor network is a collection of devices, some-
times called nodes, with sensors that typically 
communicate over a wireless network (Higgins 
et al., 2009b). A mobile sensor network (MSN) is 
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a sensor network in which the nodes are moving; 
the nodes themselves may be mobile or placed on 
mobile objects.
MSNs share a number of properties with swarm 
robotics. Both systems assume a potentially large 
number of mobile nodes that are relatively simple 
and restricted to local sensing and communication 
capabilities.
However, swarms exhibit a number of char-
acteristics that MSNs do not, namely emergent 
behaviour and self-organisation. Furthermore, 
in most wireless sensor networks nodes will take 
readings and attempt to communicate this data 
back to a more powerful device, called a sink, 
that will connect to the network periodically and 
request data. In contrast, robots distribute their 
data amongst the swarm, not to a sink, and thus 
their objective is slightly different.
There is already a considerable amount of 
research on security in MSNs and exploring the ap-
plication of existing security solutions to swarms, 
given the characteristics common to swarms and 
MSNs, should provide some relevant solutions.
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks
An ad-hoc network, as defined by (de Morais 
Cordeiro & Agrawal, 2002, Section 1), is an au-
tonomous system of mobile hosts (also serving as 
routers) connected by wireless links, the union of 
which forms a communication network modelled 
in the form of an arbitrary graph. In a mobile ad-
hoc network (MANET), the network topology may 
dynamically change in an unpredictable manner 
since the nodes are free to move. MANETs have a 
number of characteristics that are similar to those 
found in swarm robotics.
1.  MANETs lack infrastructure and trusted third 
parties. Like swarms, they are distributed 
systems.
2.  MANETs can consist of a large number 
of nodes in the network. Because of this, 
any security protocols for use in MANETs 
are applicable to a large number of nodes. 
Scalability is also important in swarms where 
solutions should be able to be applied to a 
large number of robots.
3.  Both robots in a swarm and MANETs 
have limited communication capabilities. 
It is assumed it is not possible to have all 
nodes within range of each other (de Morais 
Cordeiro & Agrawal, 2002, Section 1).
4.  Nodes in a MANET are free to move ar-
bitrarily with varying speeds, meaning the 
network topology may change randomly and 
at unpredictable times (Duggirala, 2000). A 
dynamic topology is also a characteristic 
of swarms.
However, there are some key differences 
between MANETs and swarms, some of which 
have been pointed out by Higgins et al. (2009b).
1.  Swarms use a wider range of communica-
tion methods than MANETs, including 
stigmergy.
2.  The individual identification of nodes in a 
MANET is normally an important feature, 
but this is not always the case for swarms. In 
many applications, individual robots of the 
swarm are mainly concerned with whether or 
not another robot is a member of the swarm 
and not who they are on an individual level. 
There may, however, be some applications 
in which individual identity in the swarm 
is important. One example of this may be 
when internal adversaries are present, as is 
described in the internal adversaries section 
of this chapter.
3.  MANETs are not designed to have a collec-
tive emergent behaviour like robotic swarms 
do.
4.  MANETs can consist of many types of mo-
bile devices (Higgins et al., 2009b, Section 
2) and can be either heterogeneous or homo-
geneous. Swarms, on the other hand, consist 
of few homogeneous groups of robots.
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There is a considerable amount of work on 
the security of MANETs which, given the simi-
larities between MANETs and swarms, may be 
applicable to, or provide an insight into, securing 
swarm robotic systems.
VANETs
Vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) allow ve-
hicles to wirelessly exchange information about ve-
hicle, road and traffic conditions to other vehicles 
in order to improve road safety and efficiency.
VANETs are often considered to be a subset of 
MANETs, with the vehicles acting as the nodes in 
the network. Despite this, there appear to be some 
characteristics unique to VANETs and assump-
tions of MANETs that are not necessarily true in 
VANETs. Firstly, VANETS do not assume limited 
computational ability; as noted in (Choffnes & 
Bustamante, 2007, Section 2), vehicles allow 
generous limits on power consumption and size for 
system components. MANETs, conversely, appear 
to be restricted by heavier constraints. MANETs 
are also assumed to move in an unpredictable man-
ner, whereas VANETs have a fairly constrained 
mobility and their trajectories are comparably 
predictable, mainly because vehicles follow roads. 
Additionally, VANETS have the ability to detect 
road and traffic conditions and do so by using 
sensors, whereas MANETs lack sensors and only 
communicate between themselves.
Taking into account the sensoring capabilities 
of the nodes, it may be reasonable to suggest that 
a VANET be considered as a type of MSN. More-
over, an MSN could be interpreted as a MANET 
with sensing abilities and a VANET as an MSN 
but with more predictable movements. A swarm 
has sensoring abilities and they are able to ‘read’ 
from the environment and so VANETs are similar 
to swarms in this respect.
Furthermore, the fact that VANET nodes have 
more predictable trajectories than most other 
MANETs does not necessarily rule them out as 
being regarded as a MANET; solutions that work 
for unpredictable trajectories would also work for 
predictable trajectories, but they are unlikely to 
utilise the predictable movements of the nodes 
and are therefore likely to be less efficient than 
could be achieved. Robots in swarms cannot be 
assumed to have predictable movements.
An initial impression could lead us to believe 
that robotic swarms have all the aforementioned 
abilities of MSNs and MANETs, but also further 
capabilities and behaviours such as stigmergy and 
emergent behaviour. However, these behaviours 
may also be modelled in some other systems. 
For example, VANETs could be seen to exhibit 
emergent behaviour; as described in (Choffnes 
& Bustamante, 2007, Section 2); collections 
of vehicles favour particular paths based on a 
number of different factors, such as the number 
of lanes in a road, traffic-signal behaviour and 
the proximity of certain roads to motorways etc. 
These emergent mobility patterns could be used 
to model emergent behaviour.
VANETs are an interesting technology, with 
an already significant amount of research con-
ducted into security and the reliability of messages 
sent. It is worth further considering the extent to 
which VANET security systems are applicable to 
swarm robotics and consider the consequences of 
transferring such solutions. This is done later on 
in the chapter, when the presence of an internal 
adversary is scrutinised.
Multi-Robot Systems
Like robotic swarms, multi-robot systems are col-
lections of robots working together to achieve a 
common goal (Lima & Custodio, 2005). However, 
they differ from robotic swarms because they are 
typically managed by a well-defined command and 
control structure, which is generally centralised 
or hierarchical, rather than a distributed system 
as found in a robotic swarm.
Some obvious similarities between these sys-
tems exist. They both consist of mobile, autono-
mous robots co-operating to achieve a common 
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goal. In both cases the robots have local sensing 
and communication abilities and are relatively 
incapable; having multiple robots rather than 
a single robot will enable the system to either 
achieve a goal one robot would not have been 
able to succeed at individually, or to achieve the 
goal more efficiently.
There are, however, a number of disparities. 
As noted previously, an important difference is 
that robotic swarms are fully distributed and de-
centralised, compared to having the well-defined 
command and control structure of a multi-robot 
system. Multi-robot systems are also not designed 
to be self-organising or to have an emergent be-
haviour, which are both important features found 
in robotic swarms.
Fault tolerance in multi-robot systems with 
a hierarchical command and control system has 
been explored previously, most notably by Parker 
(1998). Such studies and architectures may be 
applicable to, or when applied may highlight 
characteristics unique to, robotic swarms given 
the similarities.
Software Agents
Although there is no single universally accepted 
definition of software agents, Wooldridge (2009) 
defines an agent to be a computer system that is 
situated in some environment and is capable of 
autonomous action in this environment in order 
to meet its design objectives.
Borselius (2003, Section 2.2) highlights 
some widely accepted characteristics of software 
agents: situatedness, autonomy and flexibility. 
Situatedness is defined as meaning that the agent 
receives sensory input from the environment and 
can perform actions that change the environment 
in some way. Note that the meaning of the term 
‘environment’ varies somewhat, but could be the 
Internet or a host on which the agent is execut-
ing. Autonomy has been described previously as 
the agent having the ability to act without direct 
intervention of humans and having control over 
their own actions and internal state. Flexibility is 
defined to include the following properties:
1.  Responsive: The agent has the ability to 
perceive and react in a timely manner to its 
environment.
2.  Pro-active: The agents have the ability to 
exhibit opportunistic, goal-driven behaviour 
and take the initiative where appropriate.
3.  Social: Agents can interact with other agents 
and humans in order to solve their problems 
and help others.
In addition to situatedness, autonomy and 
flexibility, there are a number of other attributes 
defined by Borselius (2003) that software agents 
exhibit. These include: rationality, meaning the 
agent will act in a manner that helps to attain its 
goals; veracity, meaning the agent will not know-
ingly communicate false information; benevo-
lence, meaning an agent cannot have conflicting 
goals, and mobility, meaning the agent has the 
ability to move across networks and between 
different hosts to fulfil its goals. An example of a 
mobile agent would be an agent with the ability to 
migrate during execution from one host to another 
where it can then resume execution.
Similar to robotic swarms, software agents 
have no global system control and the data is 
decentralised (Borselius, 2003). The individual 
robots are relatively incapable and computation 
is asynchronous. Furthermore, if the agents are 
mobile, a dynamic network is another feature 
that multi-agent systems have in common with 
swarms. Because of these similarities, software 
agents could offer a number of security solutions 
already existing in the literature that may be ap-
plicable to swarms.
However, there are differences that may limit 
the translation of solutions from software agents 
to swarms. These differences include the physi-
cal nature of swarms, rather than the nature of 
software, and the use of stigmergy in swarms. 
However, agents do have the ability to interact with 
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their environment, but not in a physical manner 
that is required in the definition of swarms given 
by Şahin in 2005.
Furthermore, the environment in the software 
agent setting is different to that in the swarm robotic 
setting. In software agents, the environment could 
be active and hostile. A swarm’s environment on 
the other hand is likely to be passive; the robots 
trust the environment they are in compared to a 
software agent who may have to be aware of the 
environment potentially acting as an adversary.
EXTERNAL ADVERSARIES
In a swarm, there are two kinds of adversary: an 
external attacker, sometimes known as an intruder, 
and an internal attacker, sometimes called a trai-
tor, such as a robot that has been corrupted. In 
this section, we focus on protecting the swarm 
network against an external adversary.
An external adversary is an agent who is 
assumed to originate from outside the swarm. 
External adversaries are generally not considered 
to be present during the deployment of the swarm 
robotic network. The external adversary is able 
to watch and analyse the swarm post-deployment 
and does not have knowledge of any information 
stored on each individual robot.
It is assumed there are potentially a large 
number of external attackers who all have similar 
restrictions to the robots in the swarm; i.e. the 
adversaries are mobile, autonomous, physically 
embodied agents with local sensing and commu-
nication abilities. They also have limited power 
and memory and are able to observe, communicate 
with and analyse members of the swarm.
In the presence of an external adversary, 
members of the swarm are only concerned with 
whether another entity is a legitimate member of 
the swarm or not, and not with individual identi-
fication. Therefore the swarm is only required to 
Table 1. Comparison of characteristics of swarms with relevant technologies


















Large number ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Homogeneous groups ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓
Relatively incapable ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓










Co-operate to achieve goals ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Mobile ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Self-organising ✓
Collective emergent behaviour ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
Decentralised ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
No individual identity necessary ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
Lack of synchronicity ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Range of communication ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
Active and hostile environment ✓ ✓
Physical nature ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗
Dynamic network ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
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use some form of group identity as a method of 
distinguishing between external adversaries and 
swarm members. After our discussion considering 
challenges found in other technologies, it is clear 
that communication between legitimate members 
of the swarm will require some form of secret in 
order to achieve any level of security.
An external attacker could have a number of 
goals and can be either active or passive:
1.  A passive adversary may eavesdrop on the 
communication between swarm agents to 
gather information.
2.  An active adversary may:
a.  Introduce its own agents to masquer-
ade as agents of the swarm to gather 
information, plant false information or 
change the swarm’s behaviour through 
its agents’ behaviour;
b.  Capture swarm agents in order to ex-
tract information from them, remove 
information from the system, or modify 
and reintroduce them as its own agents;
c.  Attempt to attack the availability of 
the system by removing stigmergic 
messages from the environment.
The first threat can be dealt with by the use of 
appropriate encryption.
Threat 2a can be dealt with by deploying an 
authentication mechanism. Note that this does 
not require authenticating the individual identity 
of the robot, but rather authenticating a robot as 
a member of the same swarm.
Capturing agents to remove information from 
the swarm should have little impact on the swarm 
due to the high robustness provided by multiple 
agents gathering similar information. Agents 
being modified and re-introduced to the swarm 
can be mitigated by revoking agents that are 
compromised. Some key predistribution schemes 
(discussed further when addressing challenges 
unique to the swarm) are designed with this in 
mind. If we assume that compromised agents 
can be identified and that a global communica-
tion channel for updating software exists, then 
compromised agents can be revoked by updating 
keys via this channel.
Denial-of-service is similar to attacks in other 
types of network (Wood & Stankovic, 2002). This 
is difficult to prevent in general. However, due to 
the redundancy of the swarm, there will be other 
agents leaving the same stigmergic messages, 
giving some assurance that some messages will 
reach agents.
Two security solutions are highlighted here 
that appear to be applicable.
Robots in a swarm may have severe restrictions 
on resources such as memory, power, computa-
tional abilities etc. One solution will be suggested 
for securing swarms where the robots are not 
resource constrained, and a second solution will 
be suggested for swarms where the robots are 
restricted.
Robots without Constraints
Robots in a swarm without severe constraints may 
have large memory capacity, substantial compu-
tational ability and abundant power. In a swarm 
consisting of such robots, one method of securing 
communications against external adversaries is to 
use public key cryptography (PKC). Using public 
key encryption, the data passed between robots 
can be kept confidential. With the use of a digital 
signature (which is an electronic code attached 
to a message), integrity and authentication of the 
transmitted data could also be provided. Hence 
PKC can provide all the vital security services 
apart from availability.
The application of PKC in wireless sensor 
networks (WSNs) has been discussed by Lopez 
(2006). Since wireless sensors have similar re-
source constraints to swarm robots, we suggest 
that the arguments for using PKC in swarms are 
similar to those for using PKC in WSNs.
As explained by Lopez (2006), the use of PKC 
would increase the security of the network (here, 
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swarm), decrease the complexity of key distribu-
tion and authentication protocols (compared to 
using symmetric-key cryptography), and increase 
the resilience of the network (swarm) as any nodes 
(robots) captured would only enable the adversary 
to gain access to keying material of those nodes.
There are several PKC systems that could be 
used for a swarm, depending on the requirements. 
For example, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
protocol (Diffie & Hellman, 1976) could be used 
to establish a session key between robots that can 
then be used to encrypt data in a more lightweight 
symmetric cryptosystem. Alternatively, a public 
key system such as RSA (Rivest, Shamir & Adle-
man, 1978) or elliptic curve cryptography (Kapoor, 
Abraham & Singh, 2008) could be deployed.
Despite the advantages of PKC, its application 
in swarms may be impractical in some settings. 
PKC is not as efficient as symmetric-key cryp-
tography and so, in a setting with modest compu-
tational power and memory available, PKC may 
not be desirable. Furthermore, as highlighted in 
(Lopez, 2006), computations such as those used 
in PKC demand comparatively more energy; the 
creation and verification of signatures for PKC 
are also energy intensive operations. When the 
energy of the robots has been drained, agents will 
become unavailable and so, eventually, will the 
swarm. Schemes that contribute to maximising 
the life of the agents and the swarm may be desir-
able. However, some advances on increasing the 
efficiency of PKC have been made (Li & Shen, 
2011; Chapin & Skalka, 2010).
The use of PKC tends to require a public key 
infrastructure (PKI), which creates and manages 
digital certificates that bind public keys to the 
respective user identities (Ellison & Schneier, 
2000). This can be a hard process to implement 
in a decentralised swarm infrastructure.
We consider how PKC can address the chal-
lenges raised by the unique characteristics of the 
swarm (identity and secrets, stigmergy and local 
sensing).
Robots with Constraints
In a swarm where the robots have modest re-
sources, PKC may be too demanding and therefore 
undesirable. One alternative solution is to use 
symmetric-key cryptography with keys that have 
been distributed using a KPS prior to deployment.
Symmetric-key cryptography can be used to 
secure swarm communications in a way similar 
to PKC. Symmetric encryption can provide con-
fidentiality, while integrity and authentication 
can be provided using a Message Authentication 
Code (MAC), a short piece of information gener-
ated based on the message and a secret key; Bel-
lare, Canetti and Krawczyk (1996) provide more 
information on MACs.
Key predistribution in WSNs have certain 
characteristics that may make them applicable 
to swarms.
In particular, swarm robots, similar to wire-
less sensors, are distributed by a trusted central 
authority that is able to pre-load the agent with 
information before distribution. In a KPS a cen-
tral authority distributes (pre-installs) keying 
information securely prior to deployment. Pairs 
of agents can derive secret keys later on based on 
this information for subsequent cryptographic use. 
The surveys (Martin & Paterson, 2008; Walters 
et al., 2007) give many examples of KPSs, vary-
ing in designs depending on what the network 
topologies are and on what the focus of the WSNs 
application is.
One major characteristic of swarm robotics 
is emergent behaviour, in which local interac-
tions give rise to global behaviour. Because of 
the redundancy features of a swarm, the loss or 
compromise of individual agents has little impact 
on the success of the task. This has similarities 
with the deployment of WSNs: while WSNs are 
generally not concerned with emergent behaviour, 
KPSs used for WSNs are regularly designed so 
that the loss of a small proportion of the sensors 
has minimal effect on global connectivity.
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In a KPS, a subset of keys are preinstalled onto 
each node before the swarm is deployed. If two 
robots have a certain number of keys in common, 
they are able to communicate. If not, they must 
establish a path using intermediate agents. KPSs 
can be designed to prioritise memory, connectiv-
ity or resilience. In general, the larger the number 
of keys given to each agent, the higher the con-
nectivity but the lower the resilience. Hence KPS 
design revolves around a compromise between 
these three criteria.
There are two main types of KPS: probabilistic 
schemes (Eschenauer, Gligor, 2002) in which the 
subset of keys allocated to each robot is chosen 
at random, or deterministic schemes, which uses 
objects such as combinatorial designs as build-
ing blocks.
Probabilistic and deterministic KPSs have dif-
ferent advantages and disadvantages, see Martin 
(2009), Camptepe and Yener (2004) and Lee and 
Stinson (2008).
Once keys have been distributed using a KPS, 
some form of lightweight cryptosystem could be 
used for data encryption. A survey of potential 
lightweight cryptosystems is given by Eisenbarth, 
Kumar, Paar, Poschmann and Uhsadel (2007).
INTERNAL ADVERSARIES
An internal adversary is an attacker within the 
swarm: a traitor, or a robot that has been captured, 
re-programmed and re-introduced into the swarm. 
It is much stronger than an external adversary 
because it has access to any secret material estab-
lished prior to deployment and can thus potentially 
send authenticated messages, even if the messages 
are false or unreliable.
The goals of an internal adversary are similar 
to those of an external adversary, as described in 
the previous section. Any of these attacks may alter 
the emergent behaviour of the swarm. Thus it is 
crucial to be able to identify internal adversaries. 
Once an internal adversary has been identified, 
their key material can be revoked, meaning that 
their keys can no longer be used for communication 
within the swarm, thus making them incapable of 
communicating with their peers and essentially 
removing them from the swarm robotic system.
This section will consider two different 
methods for dealing with an adversary inside the 
system. There are a number of different methods 
that may be used, but threshold schemes (as used 
in VANETs) and intrusion detection systems (as 
used in MSNs) are detailed here because of their 
applicability to swarms. Note that this is not a 
comprehensive survey of defence against internal 
adversaries, but rather, we aim to point out some 
possible avenues of investigation.
One important issue raised by the presence 
of an internal adversary is that of individual 
identity. When the adversary is external, agents 
in the swarm need only concern themselves with 
whether or not whom they are communicating 
with is a member of the swarm, so group iden-
tity suffices. However, if it is a member of the 
swarm that is malicious, this means that agents 
cannot trust their peers. Some form of individual 
identity is thus necessary. Without this, the agents 
would need to continually reassess the individuals 
around them, as they would otherwise be unable 
to link the identities of neighbours that leave their 
neighbourhood and then return. The provision 
of individual identity is discussed in challenges 
found in other technologies. Most of the following 
schemes assume individual identity.
Ideally, one would like to be able to identify 
internal adversaries and to revoke them. Fur-
thermore, it would be desirable to stop genuine 
members of the swarm accepting unreliable mes-
sages from an internal adversary to prevent their 
behaviour being swayed by unreliable information.
The use of PKC in a swarm has been discussed 
when considering external adversaries with robots 
without constraints. Although a PKC scheme 
would not be able to help identify an internal ad-
versary, once the adversary has been identified the 
scheme could remove the public key certificate for 
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the adversary, stopping them from communicat-
ing with other members of the swarm. However, 
applying this in practice to a distributed swarm 
poses a number of problems with certificate man-
agement. Key predistribution also does not help 
in identifying internal adversaries. However, one 
could deal with the risk of internal adversaries by 
prioritising resilience in the KPS chosen.
There are other methods that could be used 
to identify and revoke internal adversaries. We 
describe a threshold method used in VANETs, 
which could be adapted for swarms, and an intru-
sion detection systems used in MSNs.
Threshold Schemes in VANETs
There exists a plethora of systems proposed for 
VANETs that address how to identify a traitor 
vehicle that is sending unreliable messages.
As described by Chen, Li, Martin, and Ng 
(2013), VANETs allow vehicles to exchange 
information about vehicle, road and traffic condi-
tions wirelessly. A reliable message is a message 
that reflects reality. An unreliable message, which 
may be sent either intentionally (by an internal 
adversary) or due to a hardware malfunction, can 
have undesirable consequences, such as journey 
delays or accidents, if the recipient wrongly 
considers the message to be reliable. There are a 
number of solutions to evaluating the reliability 
of messages in VANETs in the literature.
The majority of suggested schemes for 
VANETs are threshold schemes; this is where 
a message is believed to be reliable if a number 
of distinct vehicles above a threshold announce 
the same message within a given time interval. 
A number of threshold schemes have been pro-
posed, such as in (Chen, Ng, & Wang, 2011; Daza, 
Domingo-Ferrer, Sebé, & Viejo, 2009; Raya, Aziz, 
& Hubaux, 2006; Kounga, Walter, & Lachmund, 
2009; Wu, Domingo-Ferrer, & González-Nicolás, 
2010). Many of these schemes are complicated by 
the requirements of privacy and anonymity in the 
VANET system (which, while important require-
ments in a VANET are not necessarily vital in a 
swarm), and many of these schemes use resource-
intensive public key cryptographic primitives such 
as variants of digital signatures. However, many 
assume that while there is a central authority to 
help set up the scheme (legitimising vehicles, 
issuing certificates to entities and performing 
annual health checks of vehicles and other such 
procedures), this authority is not online in the 
running of the scheme. This reflects the situation 
of swarm robotic systems - before deployment, 
the robots are able to be preloaded with some 
information, such as keys and certificates, but 
after being deployed there may be no method of 
global communication with the authority. How-
ever, there may be some applications of swarms 
where a global channel of communication with 
the authority is available, and thus this would not 
be a problem.
As VANETs generally consist of a large number 
of vehicles, the majority of solutions tend to be 
scalable and so do not pose a problem with respect 
to scalability when used in swarm robotics. Most 
of the schemes mentioned here also discuss the 
possibility of revocation, a feature that is impor-
tant to have in a scheme in order to prevent traitor 
robots swaying the emergent behaviour.
Finally, it is noted that the schemes here all rely 
on each robot having an individual identity, rather 
than just a group identity. Designing a successful 
threshold scheme in which there is no individual 
identity appears to be an interesting and difficult 
problem as, without an identity, the adversary 
would be able to send the same message enough 
times to pass the threshold, resulting in their mes-
sages being accepted. One suggestion may be to 
use some form of temporary pseudonym, but one 
would require the robot to not be able to change 
pseudonym and send the same message under a 
different pseudonym.
While a threshold scheme allows robots to act 
only on reliable messages, it would also be possible 
to build into the scheme a detection system to record 
robots that send unreliable messages. However, the 
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central authority has to be informed in order for it 
to perform a revocation. Without a communication 
channel back to the central authority, there does not 
seem to be a straightforward solution.
Intrusion Detection Systems
Another method for identifying an intruder that is 
regularly used in MSNs is an intrusion detection 
system (IDS). Intrusion detection systems consist 
of an audit collection agent that collects informa-
tion about the system being observed. This data 
is then either stored or processed directly and 
presented to the site security officer (SSO), who 
will take the necessary action.
There are two generally accepted types of 
intrusion detection: anomaly-based detection and 
misuse-based detection (Axelsson, 2000; Sun, 
Osborne, Xiao, & Guizani, 2007).
In anomaly detection, all behaviour that 
is abnormal to the system is flagged. This is 
achieved by the creation of normal profiles of 
system states and comparing this to the system’s 
current behaviour. According to Axelsson (2000), 
anomaly-based detection schemes can be either 
self-learning or programmed. Self-learning sys-
tems typically observe the system for a period 
of time and build a model of what is considered 
normal. On the other hand, a programmed system 
requires someone to program the IDS to detect 
specified anomalous events.
For an anomaly-based detection scheme to be 
applicable to swarm robotics it must be a real-
time system so the agents are able to recognise an 
intruder as soon as possible. The data should be 
sourced from the network and both the data col-
lecting and data processing should be distributed, 
due to the decentralised nature of the swarms. 
When an intruder is identified, either the swarm 
responds passively to the intruder (by reporting 
back to a central authority, which may be difficult 
given the inability to communicate with the central 
authority) or the swarm takes an active approach 
where the intruder is disabled or hindered.
According to (Axelsson, 2000), there are 
very few schemes that fulfil these requirements. 
However, there is one scheme that may be ap-
plicable. Proposed by Porras and Neumann in 
1997, EMERALD is an IDS that is a real-time, 
continuous, distributed system that has an active 
response to an intruder and can collect data from 
both the host and network.
However, anomaly based IDSs may be of 
limited use when applied to swarms. One reason 
for this is due to the problem of establishing what 
behaviour is normal. This is likely to be especially 
hard in a swarm, where the agents have an emergent 
behaviour that arises from local interactions. This 
emergent behaviour cannot always be predicted 
and may not be obvious. What may appear to be 
an anomalous behaviour may in fact be the first 
sighting of a desirable behaviour that could de-
velop into global behaviour and help the swarm 
to become more efficient. Stemming anomalous 
behaviour on a local level could prevent the 
emergent behaviour of the swarm from evolving 
so that any goals are achieved more efficiently.
In a misuse-based detection scheme (Sun et 
al., 2007), alternatively called a signature scheme 
(Axelsson, 2000), behaviour that is sufficiently 
close to some previously defined pattern signature 
of a known intrusion is flagged. In the taxonomy 
proposed by Axelsson (2000), it is said that sig-
nature detection schemes are programs with an 
explicit decision rule that contains what can be 
expected to be observed in the event of an intru-
sion. The programmers can list what can be seen 
as illegal behaviour; any behaviour that is not on 
the list can be considered to be legal.
A misuse-based detection scheme may be of 
limited use in a swarm robotic network because 
of its inability to detect new attacks. However, it 
could be possible to make a list of illegal behav-
iours that would obviously conflict with the goal 
of the system. For example, if the desired collec-
tive behaviour is that of immediate aggregation, 
any robots that are obviously showing signs of 
dispersion could be highlighted as adversaries 
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because their behaviour is obviously not helping 
the swarm robotic network achieve its goal. How-
ever, behaviours such as this in a more complex 
system may be hard to find and limit the flexibility 
of the system.
In conclusion, IDSs may not be the best way 
to detect internal adversaries due to the difficulty 
of establishing what behaviour is normal in an 
anomaly based IDS, and an inability to protect 
against novel attacks in a misuse-based IDS.
Most of the schemes here appear to have a 
number of limitations when applied to a swarm. 
The nature of the infrastructure of swarms makes 
it hard to apply these schemes. In order to suc-
cessfully apply some of these schemes, a number 
of assumptions about the swarm may have to be 
relaxed. For example, if the swarm were allowed 
some form of command and control centre, there 
would be a lot more flexibility as to what schemes 
can be applied.
ADDRESSING CHALLENGES 
UNIQUE TO SWARM 
ROBOTIC NETWORKS
We previously identified three security challenges 
unique to swarm robotic networks: identity and 
secrets, stigmergy and local sensing. Here, we 
will discuss a number of ways of addressing these 
challenges and demonstrate how existing security 
solutions may be applicable.
Identity and Secrets
Recall that, in order to provide a number of secu-
rity services, the identification of robots is vital. 
Robots can either be identified as individuals, or 
as part of a swarm.
There are a number of methods of identifica-
tion that could be used, both on an individual or 
group level. Using some form of public identi-
fication (ID) code or a name is an obvious, but 
naïve, approach; it would be easy for an external 
adversary to read the ID code of a legitimate 
member (or similarly the swarm code or name) 
and then impersonate them. This is sometimes 
called a spoofing attack. As well as being resistant 
to spoofing, identities must also be unforgeable. 
ID codes and names are neither, and are thus not 
secure enough for identification in this setting.
Identifying a member of the swarm by a set 
of common behaviours (Schmidt, Leinmüller, 
Schoch, Held, & Schäfer, 2008), physical traits 
(Russell, 2004) or other public descriptors have 
been suggested. Again, however, characteristics 
such as these can be observed and copied by ex-
ternal adversaries. It would thus seem necessary 
to use some form of secret as identification. This 
secret, for example a secret key, could be used for 
either group or individual identification.
Group Identification
To protect against an external adversary, it is suf-
ficient for each robot to authenticate other robots 
as members of the swarm and not individually. One 
possible way to provide group identity is by using 
symmetric-key cryptography. This could be a way 
of identifying the robots in a resource constrained 
swarm in the presence of an external adversary, as 
has been done previously when discussing external 
adversaries. A common key could be distributed 
amongst the swarm prior to deployment that will 
be stored and used for encryption and decryption 
by each robot. If a member of the swarm receives 
a message encrypted using the common key in 
the system, then they conclude that the sender is 
a legitimate member of the swarm. Similarly, a 
sender could assume that any messages they send 
will only be read by legitimate members of the 
swarm as they are the only ones in possession of 
the necessary key to decrypt the message.
However, this use of a single common key 
would not be resilient; if a robot is captured, all 
the stored key material is available to the adversary 
and so any communications using this common 
key will be insecure. There are other ways that 
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keys could be distributed that would provide dif-
ferent levels of resilience whilst compromising 
on memory and connectivity. The robots can 
authenticate each other as members of the same 
swarm due to having common keys. One way to 
distribute these keys is through the use of a KPS, 
which has been described previously. In general the 
more keys a robot has the higher the connectivity 
(the ability of robots to communicate with each 
other) and the lower the resilience.
Other ways of providing group identity are 
available and applicable to swarms. Harney and 
Muckenhirn (1997) and Wong, Gouda and Lam 
(1998) suggest other ways in which group iden-
tification can be achieved. In Harney and Muck-
enhirn’s scheme (1997), they combine techniques 
developed for the creation of pairwise keys along 
with techniques used to distribute symmetric keys 
from a key distribution centre to a network. Wong et 
al. (1998) use key graphs to specify secure groups.
Individual Identification
With PKC robots could be uniquely identified 
by their public key. Members of the swarm 
could verify any communications to or from the 
individual; only the member with the associated 
decryption key could decrypt a message encrypted 
with the public key, and members could provide 
a cryptographic signature using their private key 
to any messages sent. If this system is used with 
a nonce (an arbitrarily chosen number to be used 
only once with each communication), adversaries 
are unable to conduct a replay attack, in which 
valid messages are maliciously delayed or re-
peated. This method is then both spoof-resistant 
and unforgeable, because members of the swarm 
can ensure that messages go to or come from 
specific members. However, this method does 
pose key management problems: as described 
by Marti and Garcia-Molina (2006), initially 
transmitting one’s public key may be susceptible 
to man-in-the-middle attacks. Having certificates 
signed by a trusted certificate authority can stop 
this problem, but requires a centralised authority, 
which is undesirable in the swarm setting. Ad-
ditionally, this method of identification involves 
high computational costs during encryption and 
decryption.
Identification may also be achievable using 
symmetric-key cryptography. Rather than giving 
every member of the swarm the same key, differ-
ent robots could be given different sets of keys 
so that there are common keys shared by pairs in 
the swarm. This would prove more resilient than 
every robot having the same key and could pro-
vide individual identity if each swarm member is 
uniquely identifiable from the set of keys it holds.
Stigmergy
There are a number of ways that stigmergy can be 
modelled that can enable it to be treated similarly 
to direct communication.
Firstly, as described by Şahin (2005), an indi-
vidual robot could opt to become immobile and 
act as a stigmergic medium to guide the rest of 
the swarm. This method considers the immobile 
robot to be part of the environment; other robots 
of the swarm leave a message with them and this 
message is then broadcast to other robots that 
pass within range.
Secondly, instead of robots opting to become 
a stigmergic medium, specific sensor nodes can 
be placed in the environment as stigmergic media. 
This is analogous to a vehicular ad hoc and sen-
sor network (VASNET), as described by (Piran, 
Murthy, & Babu, 2011), where a network is made 
up of communication and computing devices em-
bedded into vehicles and roadside sensor nodes 
are deployed at predetermined distances beside 
the road to relay messages.
Another method described in (Şahin, 2005) 
uses embedded intelligent markers in the envi-
ronment that can store stigmergic information 
and interact with each other to simulate physical 
diffusion like signal spreading.
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One further way of modelling stigmergy is 
by using software agents that interact with their 
environment. Software agents ‘read’ information 
from their environment and ‘write’ by altering 
the environment they are in. However, the virtual 
nature of agents and the potentially active environ-
ment in which they are situated may limit their 
use when modelling stigmergy.
If any of these methods were used to model 
stigmergy, then communications could be secured 
in standard ways. For example, indirect messages 
could be encrypted with either a symmetric or a 
public key and left in the environment. Further-
more, the use of short-range communication, 
which is typically used in swarm robotics, would 
ensure that only agents in the vicinity could com-
municate. Messages can also be made valid for a 
certain period of time by using a time stamp and 
a digital signature on this stamp.
Local Sensing
Recall that local sensing refers to how an agent’s 
behaviour is affected by what the agent can ob-
serve in its immediate surroundings, such as the 
configuration or behaviour of its neighbours. A 
robot needs to ensure that any behaviours it takes 
into account are from legitimate agents. This is 
possible if agents can authenticate each other.
If PKC is used, robots could use digital signa-
tures. With this tool, robots in the swarm could 
authenticate each other and ensure that only be-
haviour by authenticated members of the swarm 
influence their own behaviour. With the use of a 
KPS and symmetric-key cryptography, the robots 
could use MACs to authenticate each other.
FURTHER RESEARCH
In the preceding sections we discussed the re-
quirements for secure communication in swarm 
robotics.
There are many open problems still to be 
considered:
1.  We have shown that the use of a KPS would 
be an effective method for defending against 
external adversaries. It would be interesting 
to further study the properties of KPS that 
are useful for swarms with particular require-
ments. KPSs may have an adverse effect on 
the efficiency of the swarm because each 
robot can only communicate with another 
entity in its neighbourhood that is in posses-
sion of a common key. Implementing a KPS 
can only either keep constant or decrease the 
number of robots an individual entity can 
communicate with in its neighbourhood. 
Because of this reduced connectivity, the 
processes of the swarm will be slowed down. 
A KPS with maximal connectivity could be 
chosen in order to increase efficiency, but 
this would mean a compromise in resilience 
and memory. It would also be interesting to 
quantify this trade-off for particular swarms.
2.  An interesting topic of research would be 
to further consider software agents and to 
what extent they could be used to model a 
swarm robotic network. Although software 
agents are not autonomous like the robots 
in a swarm, they appear to be able to com-
municate implicitly and so may be useful 
in modelling stigmergy. It is also unclear 
as to whether or not the physical manner of 
swarms or the nature of their environment 
would limit their use of modelling stigmergy 
and the swarm network.
3.  The modelling of stigmergy requires further 
study. A possible tool for authentication us-
ing environmental data is keyed robust fuzzy 
extractors (Dodis, Katz, Reyzin & Smith, 
2006). Keyed robust fuzzy extractors allow 
two agents sharing a secret key to derive 
a session key using correlated input, for 
example, environmental data such as GPS 
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coordinates, temperature variations, or time, 
which are not too different from each other 
if the agents are neighbours.
Simplistically speaking, A and B can agree on 
a new key if they share the same secret (which is 
true if they belong to the same swarm) and if they 
can get closely correlated samples (near to each 
other). For example, the value P can determine 
what colour lights A emits and if B can see this 
than B can generate R. This allows “sensing”. It 
is also possible that this technique may be used 
to model pheromone-type communication, where 
traces left by an agent fade over time and are only 
acceptable if they are read quickly.
Note that we still need the KPS to predistribute 
secret keys. After that environmental variables can 
be used to modify the keys. The secret keys are 
needed since environmental variables are public 
and can also be read by adversaries. It will be 
interesting to see if such a scheme is workable.
4.  It would be interesting to study what can be 
achieved and what schemes can be applied 
to the swarm network if some of our swarm 
requirements were relaxed. For example, if a 
broadcast channel is allowed and available, a 
scheme allowing flexibility in connectivity 
and efficient revocation is possible (Kendall, 
Martin, Ng, Paterson & Stinson, 2014). With 
many KPSs, there is a fixed probability that 
two agents will be able to authenticate each 
other and this probability is decided upon 
before deployment. If we have a broadcast 
channel, we are able to change this parameter 
during deployment, according to any changes 
in the swarm or in the environment. In ad-
dition, if we know which agents have been 
compromised they can be revoked. Hence we 
see that if the swarm is allowed some form 
of command and control structure, much 
more may be achieved with potentially low 
costs.
5.  Some possible methods of defence against 
an internal adversary have been studied here, 
but none of them appeared to be sufficiently 
effective. Threshold schemes appear to be the 
most applicable to swarms, but they still have 
a number of limitations. Further suggestions 
for security solutions should be investigated 
and, due to the individual requirements of 
swarms, some schemes could be adapted to 
better suit the environment. It also appears 
to be the case that individual identity may be 
important: one must be able to distinguish 
between individuals in a swarm if it is one 
of the swarm that is an adversary. Methods 
of providing individual identity to the robots 
in a swarm network would be an interesting 
problem to further explore.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we have discussed a number of 
ways to secure communications in swarm robot-
ics. After defining several aspects of security and 
briefly discussing how these can be achieved, we 
considered a number of applications of swarms 
and identified the security services that may 
be vital in a swarm setting. We considered the 
challenges posed by the nature of the swarm 
network; some challenges were common and had 
been considered in similar technologies, whereas 
other challenges, such as stigmergy, appeared to 
be unique to swarms.
After considering the challenges, a number 
of technologies that have already have well re-
searched security solutions were discussed. These 
technologies had a number of characteristics in 
common with swarms and hence their solutions 
may be applicable and adaptable to swarms.
It is important that security is not forgotten 
in the rush to deploy robotic swarms. We have 
shown that established techniques will go a long 
way towards making swarm robotic environments 
robust to the main threats to their security.
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Availability: Availability ensures that acces-
sibility and usability are available upon demand 
by an authorised entity. The loss of availability is 
commonly referred to as a denial-of-service attack.
Confidentiality: The assurance that no one 
other than the intended recipient(s) can read the 
data; in other words, the data is kept secret between 
the sender and recipient.
Cryptography: Cryptography is the art (and 
science) of designing cryptosystems to transform 
messages in such a way that two entities may 
communicate securely over an insecure channel.
Data Origin Authentication: A security ser-
vice that identifies a specific entity as the source 
or origin of a given piece of data.
Entity Authentication: Sometimes called 
identification, entity authentication is a security 
service that identifies specific entities in isola-
tion from any other activity the entity may want 
to perform.
External Adversary: An external adversary 
is an agent who, unlike an internal adversary, is 
assumed to originate from outside the swarm and 
thus is not in possession of any secret material 
established prior to deployment.
Identification: Sometimes called entity au-
thentication, identification is a security service 
that identifies specific entities in isolation from 
any other activity the entity may want to perform.
Integrity: The assurance that the data has not 
been altered, either maliciously or accidentally, 
in an unauthorised way.
Internal Adversary: An internal adversary 
is an attacker from within the swarm that has 
access to any secret material established prior to 
deployment.
Resilience: A swarm is resilient if the loss of 
individual agents has little impact on the success 
of the task of the swarm.
